St. Mary's Law Journal
Volume 5

Number 3

Article 1

9-1-1973

Reduction and Exclusion Clauses in Uninsured Motorist Coverage.
Royal H. Brin Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal
Part of the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Royal H. Brin Jr., Reduction and Exclusion Clauses in Uninsured Motorist Coverage., 5 ST. MARY'S L.J.
(1973).
Available at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol5/iss3/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the St. Mary's Law Journals at Digital Commons at St.
Mary's University. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. Mary's Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons at St. Mary's University. For more information, please contact sfowler@stmarytx.edu.

Brin: Reduction and Exclusion Clauses in Uninsured Motorist Coverage.

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL
Copyright 1974, ST. MARY'S UNIVERSITY

VOLUME

5

FALL

1973

NUMBER

3

REDUCTION AND EXCLUSION CLAUSES
IN UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE
ROYAL H. BRIN, JR.*

Uninsured motorist coverage in the automobile insurance field has
created many knotty legal problems for the courts, usually leading to
diverse results in different jurisdictions. The anomalous nature of the
coverage, creating conflicting interests and duties on the part of the
insurer under different coverages within the same policy, is perhaps
responsible for a number of the problems which have arisen. Another
fertile source of litigation has been the fact that uninsured motorist
coverage, or at least the offer of it, has been made mandatory in all
automobile liability policies by statute in nearly all states, giving rise
to questions as to whether particular policy provisions are contrary to
the public policy as expressed in such statutes.
It is understood that the problems of stacking, or pyramiding, the
stated limits of uninsured motorist coverage under different policies,
or under one policy providing such coverage on several vehicles, and
the effect in that connection of the "other insurance," "excess-escape"
and "pro rata" clauses thereon, is being treated elsewhere in this Journal. Consideration will, therefore, be given here to other reduction,
exclusion, or limitation clauses in uninsured motorist coverage, and in
particular those dealing with the effect of medical payments, workmen's
compensation, settlements with an insured motorist, and occupancy of
a vehicle owned by the named insured or a relative, but not insured
by the policy.
THE MEDICAL PAYMENTS REDUCTION CLAUSE

One such provision calls for crediting under uninsured motorist coy* Partner, Strasburger, Price, Kelton, Martin' & Unis, Dallas, Texas; B.A., J.D.,
University of Texas.
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erage of any payments made under the medical payments provisions
of. the same policy:
The company shall not be obligated to pay under this coverage
that part of the damages which the insured may be entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile
which represents expenses for medical services paid or payable under Part II [medical payments coverage].'
The construction of this policy language is not open to question.
It clearly is intended to reduce any payment otherwise due under uninsured motorist coverage by that due or paid under the medical payments coverage of the same policy. The only question is thus; whether
there is anything in the particular uninsured motorist statute, express
or implied, to invalidate such a contractual provision.
The states are divided upon this particular question. Thus, Miller
v. Cosmopolitan Mutual Insurance Co. 2 declares of such policy language that it "unequivocally provided that damages recoverable thereunder were not to include any amount for medical expenses paid or
payable under the medical payment provisions of the policy." 3 The
court then goes on to state that "[i]n our opinion, this limiting provision violates neither statute nor public policy . . . .
A number of
other cases have reached the same result, upholding and enforcing this
provision. 5 An example wherein the provision was given its utmost
effect is presented by L'Manian v. American Motorists Insurance Co.,'
holding that where the insured has recovered under his uninsured motorist coverage an amount including his medical expenses, he cannot
1. All references to insurance policy provisions within this article are taken from
the Texas Standard Family Combination Automobile Policy as prescribed by the Texas

Board of Insurance Commissioners.
2. 307 N.Y.S.2d 592 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
3. Id. at 593.
4. Id. at 593, citing In re Napolitano, 287 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1967); In re Durant,
260 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1965); Silinsky v. State-Wide Ins. Co., 289 N.Y.S.2d 541 (Sup. CL
1968). Similarly, Boehler v. Insurance Co. of N. America, 290 F. Supp. 867 (E.D.
Ark. 1968) states, "In this Court's estimation the provision in question is a reasonable
one and does not offend either the statute or public policy." Id. at 870.
5. Pinkus v. Southern Farm Bur. Cas. Ins. Co., 292 F. Supp. 141 (ED. Ark.
1968); Fisher v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 721 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1966); Bailes v. Southern Farm Bur. Cas. Ins. Co., 252 So. 2d 123 (La. Ct.
App. 1971); Connelly v. Southern Farm Bur. Cas. Co., 219 So. 2d 206 (La. Ct.

App. 1969); Morgan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 195 So. 2d 648 (La. Ct.
App. 1967); Hutchison v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 312 N.Y.S.2d 789 (Sup. Ct.
1970); Jenkins v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 1970 CCH AUTO L. REP., AUTO.
CAs. 6711 (Tenn. 1970).

6. 236 A.2d 349 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1967).
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again recover those expenses in an action on the medical payments
7
coverage.
On the other hand, the appellate courts of a number of states have
held that this limitation or offset is not enforceable. Thus, Stephens
v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co.' concludes its discussion of the problem as follows:
We therefore hold that a provision in an automobile liability policy that an insurer shall not be obligated to pay under uninsured
motorist coverage for that part of the damages which the insured
may be entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile which represents expenses for medical services
paid or payable under the medical payments coverage of the policy is void and against public policy in that it reduces the minimum coverage of uninsured motorist protection prescribed and
required by the law.'
A similar basis is given by the other cases reaching this result.'
The argument for validity is that the policy provision here is clear
and unambiguous and likewise consistent with the statutory policy,
since, when it is given effect, the insured is in the same situation he
would have been in if the other driver had carried a liability policy
with minimum limits. The purpose of uninsured motorist statutes is
not frustrated by the provision Which only seeks to avoid double recovery and does not reduce the total recovery under the policy below
the statutory standard. This is particularly so when the medical payment coverage contains a subrogation provision and allowance of the
reduction would put the insured in the same position as if the other
motorist had liability coverage to the minimum limits. It cannot be
said that there is failure of consideration for the premiums paid if the
provision is given effect because it may be presumed that the officials
charged with control of premium rates will take such set-off provision
into account. There would seem to be no policy consideration behind
7. Id. at 352; accord, Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rhodes, 47 Cal. Rptr. 467
(Dist. Ct. App. 1965).

8. 156 N.W.2d 133 (Neb. 1968).
9. Id. at 140.

10. Booth v. Seaboard Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 431 F.2d 212 (8th Cir. 1970);
Heiss v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 465 S.W.2d 699 (Ark. 1971); Bacchus v. Farmers Ins.
Group Exch., 475 P.2d 264 (Ariz. 1970); Tuggle v. Government Employees Ins. Co.,
207 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1968); Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Gavin, 196 So. 2d 440 (Fla.
1967); Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Siddons, 451 S.W.2d 831 (Ky. 1970); Pleitgen v.
Farmers Ins. Exch., 207 N.W.2d 535 (Minn. 1973); Kinkead v. Buckeye Union Ins.

Co., 276 N.E.2d 673 (Ohio Ct. C.P. Franklin Co. 1970); Peterson v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 393 P.2d 651 (Ore. 1964); Aldcroft v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 259

A.2d 408 (R.I. 1969); Lyon v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 480 P.2d 739 (Utah 1971).
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uninsured motorist statutes to require double payment of medical expenses.
The main argument for denying validity to the provision is that allowing the offset would have the effect of reducing the statutory minimum of uninsured motorist coverage, allowing insurers contractually
to alter the terms of the statute and escape part of the liability the
legislature intended for them to provide. Under this view the medical
payment coverage of the policy is independent of the uninsured motorist coverage and should be considered just as if it were in a different
policy issued by a different issuer.
In Texas, the question was first presented in a diversity case in federal court, Bogart v. Twin City Fire Insurance Co." In making an
"Erie-educated guess" as to what the Texas law would be, the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered Texas cases dealing with
other aspects of uninsured motorist coverage 2 and concluded that "the
medical payments offset clause is void as contrary to public policy."'"
It noted that the Texas holdings relied upon concerned offsets of insurance provided by other policies whereas "the insurance sought to
be offset in this case is found in the same policy," but considered the
4
same reasoning to be applicable.1
The first state court case in Texas on the question was Dhane v.
Trinity Universal Insurance Co.,"5 where the court agreed with Bogart
but noted that as in Bogart, the total damages suffered exceeded the
recovery under both coverages, so that there was no problem of double
recovery.' 6
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION REDUCTION AND EXCLUSION CLAUSES

Another clause in the uninsured motorist portion of the standard
Texas automobile liability policy provides that the amount of recovery
thereunder should be reduced by the extent of any workmen's compensation benefits paid because of the bodily injury in question:
11. 473 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1973).
12. American Liberty Ins. Co. v. Ranzau, 481 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. Sup. 1972);
Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. McMahon, 487 ;S.W.2d 371 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont

1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lawson, 476 S.W.2d 931 (Tex.

Civ. App.-Tyler 1972, no writ); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Gatlin, 470 S.W.2d 925 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1971, no writ).

13. 473 F.2d 619, 626 (5th Cir. 1973).
14. Id. at 626.

15. 497 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973, writ granted).
16. Id. at 329. This case also included stacking of uninsured motorist coverage and
is now before the Supreme Court of Texas.
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Limits of Liability

(b) Any amount payable under the terms of this Part because
of bodily injury sustained in an accident by a person who is an insured under this part shall be reduced by
(2) the amount paid and the present value of all amounts payable on account of such bodily injury under any workmen's compensation law, disability benefits law or any similar law.
In addition to this reduction clause, there is also an exclusionary clause,
providing that the policy does not apply under its uninsured motorist
coverage
(c) so as to inure directly or indirectly to the benefit of any
workmen's compensation or disability benefits carrier or any person or organization qualifying as a self-insurer under any workmen's compensation or disability benefits law or any similar law.
While some of the considerations with respect to the workmen's compensation provisions are the same as with respect to the clause for reduction because of medical payments, there are additional factors involved.
In many jurisdictions, the workmen's compensation law gives the
compensation carrier subrogation rights, raising the problem of
whether payments under the uninsured motorist coverage would actually benefit the carrier rather than the insured in such a situation if
no reduction is allowed. Further, while the limits of medical payments
coverage are usually small, workmen's compensation can ordinarily be
much larger; thus, the insured may often be fully indemnified by
his workmen's compensation benefits, so that any uninsured motorist
coverage recovery would permit him to realize a net gain from the
accident and to recover more than his actual damages.
The various states are divided as to the validity of workmen's compensation reduction clauses, with the majority approving them. Perhaps the best explication of the majority position is that in Ullman
v. Wolverine Insurance Co."7 In holding workmen's compensation
benefits paid validly deductible from the amount otherwise payable
under uninsured motorist coverage, the Supreme Court of Illinois
states:
It would appear that the purpose of the provision in our Insurance
Code requiring that every automobile liability policy shall contain
17. 269 N.E.2d 295 (111. 1970).
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uninsured motorist vehicle coverage in an amount not less than the
limits described in the Financial Responsibility Law . . .was intended to place the policyholder in substantially the same position
he would occupy, so far as his being injured or killed is concerned, if the wrongful driver had had the minimum liability insurance required by the Financial Responsibility Act."'
The Illinois laws mentioned are virtually identical to those in Texas. 9
The opinion goes on to point out that there is no language in the statute
"either prohibiting or authorizing the insurer to deduct workmen's
' 20
compensation benefits paid or payable to the insured.
Ullman then agrees with the holdings that deduction of compensation benefits from a minimum required uninsured motorist coverage
is not contrary to public policy and distinguishes contrary cases on the
ground that the workmen's compensation statutes in the states concerned did not give full subrogation to the compensation carrier or
employer. In such states, "an uninsured motorist provision calling for
the deduction in full of workmen's compensation benefits would cause
an employee to receive less protection under the policy than he would
had the tort-feasor been insured."'" Where there is full right of subrogation to any recovery from a third party, however, as in Illinois and
Texas, when the challenged deduction is permitted, "the employee's
position is the same under the uninsured motorist coverage as it would
be had the tort-feasor carried the minimum insurance. "2 - In neither
instance does the employee retain both compensation and identical
damages from the tort-feasor and, as stated by the co:. rt:
The deduction provision does not cause the employee with uninsured motorist coverage to have less financial protection than he
would have had if the tort-feasor had carried insurance in the minimal amount. Were we to hold it is contrary to public policy, it
would mean that an injured employee's extent of recovery, under
circumstances such as exist here, would hinge on the fortuitous
circumstance that the tort-feasor was uninsured and was not otherwise financially responsible. We do not consider that a policy
limitation which precludes this result is offensive to public policy.1'
18. Id.at 297.
19. See TEx. INS. CODE ANN.art. 5.06-1 (Supp. 1974).
20. Ullman v. Wolverine Ins. Co., 269 N.E.2d 295, 297 (Il. 1970).
21. Id. at 298.
22. Id. at 298.
23. Id. at 298; accord, Niekamp v. Allstate Ins. Co., 202 N.E.2d 126 (III. Ct.
App. 1964).
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In Hackman v. American Mutual Liability Insurance Co.,24 the pertinent discussion by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire includes
the following:
Essentially any dispute over the right of a liability carrier to thus
limit its liability lies between the 'compensation carrier and the liability carrier and does involve the plaintiff. The fact that American carries both coverages here and thus it is in the same position
financially as it would be if it insured the tort-feasor does not reduce Hackman's recovery below the amount he would have recovered if injured by an insured operator. The limitation in the
endorsement reducing the award by the amount Hackman has received in compensation benefits is valid against him. In the Ullman [Ullman v. Wolverine Ins. Co., 244 N.E.2d 827 (Ill. Ct.
App. 1969)] case it is pointed out that Peterson v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 393 P.2d 651 and Standard Accident Insurance Co. v. Gavin (Fla. App.), 184 So. 2d 229, relied
upon by the plaintiff here involve jurisdictions where the compensation carrier is not entitled to recover all of the compensation
benefits paid by it.25
In addition to Illinois and New Hampshire, other states which have
reached this result include California26 where the statute expressly
authorizes a deduction,27 Arkansas,2 8 Louisiana, 9 Michigan, ° New
32
York,3 1 and New Jersey.
Cases to the contrary in Florida 3 and Oregon3 4 can be distinguished,
as suggested in Ullman, on the ground that the workmen's compensation laws in those states do not give complete subrogation rights to
the workmen's compensation carrier. However, there are cases in other
states not so distinguishable that nevertheless hold the reduction clause
as to workmen's compensation invalid. Thus, in Rhode Island, A ld24. 261 A.2d 433 (N.H. 1970).
25. Id. at 436 (citations omitted).
26. Waggaman v. Northwestern Security Ins. Co., 94 Cal. Rptr. 170 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1971); Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Houchins, 90 Cal. Rptr. 414 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1970); Jarrett v. Allstate Ins. Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 231 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962); see
Eliopulos v. North River Ins. Co., 33 Cal. Rptr. 449 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
27. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580-2(h)(1) (Deering Supp. 1973).

28. Edmundson v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 459 S.W.2d 112 (Ark. 1970).

29. Allen v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 188 So. 2d 741 (La. Ct. App.
1966). But see Williams v. Buckalew, 246 So. 2d 58 (La. Ct. App. 1970).
30. Michigan Mut. Liab. Co. v. Mesner, 139 N.W.2d 913 (Mich. Ct. App. 1966).
31. Napolitano v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp., 287 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1967);
Vartanian v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp., 283 N.Y.S.2d 762 (Sup. Ct. 1967);

Danielewicz v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp., 271 N.Y.S.2d 735 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
32. Brooks v. Pennsylvania Mfrs. Ass'n Ins. Co., 303 A.2d 884 (N.J. 1973).
33. Southeast Title & Ins. Co. v. Austin, 202 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 1967); Standard
Acc. Ins. Co. v. Gavin, 184 So. 2d 229 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).

34. Peterson v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 393 P.2d 651 (Ore. 1964).
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croft v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. 35 reaches that result on the bassis of
the legislative intent embodied in the uninsured motorist coverage:
We are persuaded that . . . the legislature intended to give an
insured motorist operating on the public ways protection against
the economic loss that might result from the negligent operation of
uninsured motor vehicles. The protection was to be in an amount
of at least $10,000 for bodily injury or death in the case of one
person in any one accident, and the legislature commanded that
this protection be made available to every insured to whom a policy is issued for liability insurance unless specifically rejected.
Nothing in the statute warrants the issuance of a policy providing
for such protection of the insured motorist in any lesser amount or
in any alternative amount. The coverage directed in the statute
must be given unless the insured rejects it in specific terms.
The coverage in the policy delivered to the insured in the instant case is different from that mandated in the statute. It requires the insured, if he desires to accept the policy so issued, to
agree that any award of damages or amount paid him under a
workmen's compensation or a similar piece of legislation be deducted from any award of damages he may recover from the tortfeasor. Nothing in the statute, in our opinion, confers upon the
insurer any authority to require an insured to accept a policy proffered for delivery which contains such a limitation upon the mandated statutory coverage.
Because we take this view, we find that the provisions of the
policy limiting the liability of the insured as is therein provided
are. . . void, and the policy is to be construed as having included
within its terms coverage against damage by uninsured motorists up
to the extent of the statutory limit, that is, $10,000 for bodily injury to one person in any one accident. '
Alabama, 7' Pennsylvania, 8 and Colorado"9 have taken similar positions. Likewise, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit has concluded that under the law of Nebraska this reduction
provision is not enforceable.4" This result was reached even though
the uninsured motorist coverage and the compensation benefits together
exceeded the amount of the judgment obtained by the insureds against
35. 259 A.2d 408 (R.I. 1969).
36. Id. at 413-14.
37. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cahoon, 252 So. 2d 619 (Ala.
Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Holmes, 251 So. 2d 213 (Ala. 1971).
38. Rhodes v. Automotive Ignition Co., 275 A.2d 846 (Pa. Super. Ct.
39. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hillyer, 509 P.2d 810 (Colo. Ct. App.
40. Booth v. Seaboard Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 431 F.2d 212 (8th Cir.
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the uninsured tort-feasor, the court declaring that "[t]he interpretation
of the statute and application of the set-off clause should not turn upon
the contingency of the amount of damages and the amount of collateral insurance available.'
In Texas, the question was initially presented in Fidelity & Casualty
Co. v. McMahon.4 The majority opinion quoted from American Liberty Insurance Co. v. Ranzau4" and considered it controlling here, stating: "The language and logic of this decision clearly seemed determinative of the question here presented. Workmen's compensation is
certainly 'other insurance.' "I' The opinion goes on to state:
Appellant argues that Art. 8307, Sec. 6a, Vernon's Ann. Civ. St.
[giving the compensation carrier subrogation to the rights of the
injured employee against others] takes our case out of the Ranzau
holding. It contends that to extend this holding to our situation
would give to McMahon a benefit he would not have had if Strahan had been covered by liability insurance. This argument, of
course, has appeal but we think the answer to it is that the one is
conferred by legislative act, while the other is a contract provision
without such approval.45
The dissent by Justice Keith considered that the holding in Ranzau
by a divided supreme court was not dispositive of the question here
and would follow Ullman and Hackman, regarding the logic of those
cases as unanswered by the majority opinion. 6
In Bogart, mentioned above in another connection, the obverse situation was presented, with the workmen's compensation insurer having
intervened in the employee's action against his uninsured motorist insurance carrier to assert its right of subrogation in any recovery. The
federal court considered the Texas law, under Article 8307, Section
6a, Revised Civil Statutes, to provide the right of subrogation only
against a third party tort-feasor and not against any uninsured motorist insurance. Because of such interpretation of the statute and because
of the clause in the uninsured motorist section of the automobile policy
excluding workmen's compensation carriers from benefits thereunder,
41.

Id. at 219.

42. 487 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973, writ ref'dn.r.e.).
43. 481 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. Sup. 1972).

44. Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. McMahon, 487 S.W.2d 371, 372 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
45. Id. at 372; accord, Hamaker v. American States Ins. Co., 493 S.W.2d 893
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
46. Id. at 372-73
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the intervenor was denied any recovery.4 7 No state appellate court in

Texas has yet passed directly upon this aspect of the problem.
SETTLEMENTS WITH AN INSURED MOTORIST

Still another situation giving rise to reduction and exclusion problems is presented when the insured is in an accident which involves
not only an uninsured motorist, but also another insured motorist, with
whom he settles. The uninsured motorist coverage provisions of the
standard automobile policy contain an express exclusion that uninsured
motorist coverage does not apply:
(b) to bodily injury to an insured with respect to which such
insured, his legal representative or any person entitled to payment
under this coverage shall, without written consent of the company,
make any settlement with any person or organization who may be
legally liable therefor.
There is also a provision under the heading of "Limits of Liability"
which states:
Any amount payable under the terms of this Part because of bodily injury sustained in an accident by a person who is an insured
under this Part shall be reduced by (1) all sums paid on account
of such bodily injury by or on behalf of (i) the owner or operator
of the uninsured automobile and (ii) any other person or organization jointly or severally liable together with such owner or operator for such bodily injury ....
48
Where the claimant has settled with and been paid by or on behalf
of an insured motorist involved in the accident and brings suit against
his own uninsured motorist coverage carrier on the ground that there
was also liability on the part of an uninsured motorist, several defenses
47. Bogart v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 473 F.2d 619, 627-28 (5th Cir. 1973).
48. There is a further provision under the heading of "Trust Agreement" as follows:
In the event payment to any person under this Part:
(a) the company shall be entitled to the extent of such payment to the proceeds
of any settlement or judgment that may result from the exercise of any rights of
recovery of such person against any person or organization legally responsible for
the bodily injury because of which such payment is made; (b) such person shall
hold in trust for the benefit of the company all rights of recovery which he shall
have against such other person or organization because of the damages which are
the subject of claim made under this Part; (c) such person shall do whatever is
proper to secure and shall do nothing after loss to prejudice such rights; (d) if
requested in writing by the company, such person shall take, through any representative designated by the company, such action as may be necessary or appropriate to recover such payment as damages from such other rcrson or organization, such action to be taken in the name of such person; in the event
of a recovery, the company shall be reimbursed out of such recovery for expenses, costs and attorneys' fees incurred by it in connection therewith; (e) such
person shall execute and deliver to the company such instruments and papers as may
be appropriate to secure the rights and obligations of such person and the company
established by this provision.
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may be asserted. One contention that may be advanced is that a settlement and release bars any recovery under uninsured motorist coverage by cutting off that carrier's subrogation rights. Another argument
is that by reason of the exclusion arising in the event of any settlement
without consent of the company, the assured is denied recovery. Finally, the recovery may be denied by reason of credit for the amount
received under the reduction clause. The opposing contention is that
in the light of the uninsured motorist coverage statutes, these provisions
can be valid only with respect to any settlement with or payment by
the uninsured motorist.
Here, again, the results have not been consistent in all jurisdictions,
but it appears to be the majority view that the pertinent policy provisions include, and validly so, settlements with any insured motorist
involved in the accident. Thus, LaBove v. American Employers Insurance Co.4" denied recovery in a case involving a three-vehicle accident. The car which actually collided with the insured was itself covered by insurance but was passing an uninsured motorist whom the
claimant contended was guilty of negligence causing the accident. The
claimant settled with the driver of the insured automobile that collided
with him, without the consent of his own insurer, and then sued such
insurer under the uninsured motorist coverage of his policy. The Louisiana court affirmed summary judgment for the insurer, the discussion
including the following:
The defendant insurer admits that one purpose of the exclusion
is to prevent the insured from making a small settlement with the
uninsured motorist, who might then testify admitting liability; or
who may have assets which would, because of the settlement, become unavailable to indemnify the insurer for any payment it
makes. Nevertheless, the language is not restricted to settlement
with the uninsured motorist. It clearly and unequivocally states
that a settlement with any person who "may be" liable, made
without the written consent of the insurer, precludes recovery.
As used here, the words "may be legally liable" clearly refer to
any person who possibly, perhaps or by chance may be liable and
not to any person who has already been held liable by judgment of
court. Applying this construction to the present case, it is clear
that the settlement with Ardoin was made; and that Ardoin may
possibly be liable. Hence, coverage is excluded. 0
49. 189- So. 2d 315 (La. Ct. App. 1966).
50. Id. at 318 (court's emphasis). The court discussed at length several of the
underlying purposes of the exclusion stating that:
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Since it was held that the exclusion clause prevented recovery, the court
found it unnecessary to pass upon the effect of the reduction clause
in the limits of liability provisions.5 1 Similar results have been reached

in California,5" Missouri,53 Alabama,5 4 South Carolina,55 Illinois, "6
New York,57 and Florida. 5
This position likewise has been supported by most commentators who have touched on the question. 9

Michigan Mutual Liability Co. v. Karsten6" is perhaps the leading
case for the opposing position. It held that settlement with the insured
motorist did not in itself preclude any recovery and that the settlement
amount should not be subtracted from the maximum coverage to determine liability of the uninsured motorist carrier but rather only from
the total amount of damages suffered. The exclusion clause was interpreted to mean that the settlement forbidden was only "one made by
the insured with a person legally liable for injuries caused by an accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the uninsured
vehicle." 61 This view was supported by the general principle that an
insurance policy should be given the construction most favorable to
the insured. The court then construed the limits of liability provision
The purposes of the exclusion also support defendant's view. One obvious purpose is to prevent settlements with parties who perhaps "may be" liable, without
first putting the insurer on notice of the proposed settlement. Under the terms of
the policy, the amount payable under the uninsured motorists clause is reduced by
any sum received from any person who is jointly liable. Hence, the defendant
insurer is interested in having notice of any such settlements. Defendant also
might possibly want to enter into the negotiations in an effort to make an advantageous settlement of its own coverage. Also, it is obvious that defendant's
subrogation rights would probably be lost by such a settlement and, hence, defendant would lose this valuable right.
51. Id. at 318. Other Louisiana cases that arrived at a similar result include:
Sylvest v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 252 So. 2d 693 (La. Ct. App. 1971);
Conner v. American Employers Ins. Co., 189 So. 2d 319 (La. Ct. App. 1966). In
Sylvest, the parents were held to be precluded from recovery by a settlement with
the driver's insurer where a child was killed while riding as a passenger in an insured
vehicle that collided with an uninsured motorist.
52. Portillo v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 47 Cal. Rptr. 450 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Mills
v. Farmers Jns. Exch., 41 Cal. Rptr. 650 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
53. Kisling v. M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co., 399 S.W.2d 245 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966).
54. Dancy v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 324 F. Supp. 964 (S.D. Ala. 1971).
55. Senn v. J.S. Weeks & Co., 180 S.E.2d 336 (S.C. 1971).
56. See Remsen v. Midway Liquors, Inc., 174 N.E.2d 7 (II1. CL App. 1961).
57. McGee v. Horvat, 260 N.Y.S.2d 345 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
58. McInnis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 208 So. 2d 481 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1968).
59. See Beck, Insured versus Insurer versus Uninsured Motorist, 20 DEFENSE L.J.
1 (1971); Chadwick & Poch6, California's Uninsured Motorist: Scope and Problems,
13 HASTINGS L.J. 202 (1962); Drummond, Uninsured Motorist Coverage-A Suggested
Approach to Consistency, 23 ARK. L. REv. 167 (1969).

60. 163 N.W.2d 670 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968).
61. Id. at 671-72 (court's emphasis).
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so that the settlement amount from the insured motorist may be subtracted only from the total damages arising out of the accident, and
62
not from the coverage limits.
American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Thompson6 3 reaches a similar result but points out that the Oregon statute, as it existed at the
time of the accidents there involved, did not provide for subrogation
for uninsured motorist payments. 64 The statute was subsequently
amended to do so and the opinion recognizes that in cases arising under
the amended statute, the result would be different.65 Volkswagen Insurance Co. v. Taylor"6 contains some language in accord with Karsten,
but it is at best dictum since the opinion puts stress on the fact that
there were two separate collisions, one involving the uninsured motorist
and the other an insured motorist, with a time interval between them. 7
The result was further based upon waiver by failure of the uninsured
motorist carrier to timely assert its policy defense.A
In Texas, this problem was first broached in Allstate Insurance Co.
v. Clarke.6 9 The policy there was issued before the passage of Article
5.06-1(3), Texas Insurance Code, but the court did construe the policy
provision and held it to give the insurer the right of subrogation against
an insured joint tort-feasor as well as against the uninsured motorist.7 0
The language of the statute in this connection, article 5.06-1 (3), is
virtually identical to that in the standard policy form as used both before and after the adoption of the statute:
In the event of payment to any person under the coverage required by this section and subject to 'the terms and conditions of
such coverage, the insurer making such payment shall, to the extent thereof, be entitled to the proceeds of any settlement or judgment resulting from the exercise of any rights of recovery of such
person against any person or organization legally responsible for
the bodily injury, sickness or disease, or death for which such payment is made.
The first Texas case passing upon this question under a policy issued
62. Id. at 672-73.
63. 453 P.2d 164 (Ore. 1969).
64. Id. at 165-66.
65. Id. at 166.
66. 201 So. 2d 624 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
67. Id. at 627. Even in such a situation, some of the cases cited in support of the
majority rule have held to the contrary.
68. Id. at 628.
69. 471 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
70. Id. at 907.
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after the effective date of the uninsured motorist statute was Jobe v.
InternationalService Insurance Co. 7' The plaintiffs there were pedestrians who were injured when automobiles driven by Goss and Amunson
collided, Goss being insured and Amunson uninsured. Claimants sued
Goss and Amunson and also their own insurance companies under the
uninsured motorist provisions of their policies. Liability was found
on the part of both drivers, and Goss' insurer made payment on his
behalf:
Jobe recovered $61,175 judgment against Goss and Amunson,
jointly and severally; and Corby recovered $25,495 judgment
against Goss and Amunson, jointly and severally. Goss had $20,000 liability insurance; Amunson was uninsured. 'Goss' insurance
carrier paid Jobe and Corby $10,000
each. Nothing has been
2
paid by or on behalf of Amunson.7
The opinion goes on to state:
Appellees' policies provide that they would pay appellants
damages legally recoverable from an uninsured and that any
amount so payable "shall be reduced" by all sums paid on behalf
of (i) the owner of the uninsured automobile and (ii) any other
person jointly or severally liable together with such owner.
Allstate paid on behalf of Goss who was jointly and severally
liable with the uninsured. Thus under the policy appellees had
the right to reduce their liability in the amount of the sums paid.
And appellees are entitled to the extent of their payment, under
the "Trust Agreement" provision of the policies, to the proceeds
of settlement of any person legally responsible, because of which
such payment was made. The payment was made on behalf of
Goss, and Goss is jointly and severally liable with Amunson.7 3
The court held that the policy terms in question were "specifically authorized and sanctioned by Section 3, Article 5.06-1 of the Insurance
''74
Code, V.A.T.S.
Jobe was followed by Grissom v. Southern Farm Bureau Insurance
Co.,7 5 which held that the uninsured motorist provision excluding coverage where the insured, without written consent of the insurer, makes
settlement with any person or organization who may be legally liable,
was clear and applicable to settlement with an insured motorist as well
as the uninsured motorist. 76 The court also held that where the provi71. 474 S.W.2d 11 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
72. Id. at 13.

73. Id. at 13.
74. Id. at 13.
75.

476 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

76. Id. at 450.
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sion had been approved by the State Board of Insurance prior to the
issuance of policies, it would be enforced as written against insureds
who made such a settlement without the written consent of the insurer. 7 The same result was again reached in Traders & General Insurance Co. v. Reynolds,"8 which held that the recoupment and credit
provisions were not in derogation of the statute and must be enforced
according to their terms,' and once more in Jessie v. Security Mutual
Casualty Co."° Thus, the Texas position on this situation can now
be regarded as well settled.
A refinement of the Texas rule in this connection appears in the
recent case of Dairyland County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Roman."l
There the insured, who was asserting liability against his insurer under
the uninsured motorist provisions of his policy, executed a release without consideration to a second uninsured motorist involved in the accident. It was held, however, that since the evidence conclusively established that there was no consideration for this release, it was not binding and did not impair the insurer's subrogation rights and thus did
not constitute a "settlement" within the meaning of the exclusion and
therefore, the uninsured motorist coverage was not lost.8 2 Apparently
the same would be true in the event of a release without consideration
of an insured motorist.
OTHER REDUCTION AND EXCLUSION CLAUSES

Another exclusionary clause was presented to a Texas court in Stagg
v. Travelers Insurance Co.8s This was a suit on an uninsured motorist
endorsement attached to a garage liability policy issued to the father
on one owned automobile. While one of the insured's sons was driving another automobile, record title to which was in his brother and
which was insured under a different policy, a collision occurred with
an uninsured motorist. An exclusionary clause provided that the uninsured motorist coverage did not apply to an injury to an insured while
occupying a vehicle (other than an insured highway vehicle) owned
by the named insured or any relative, resident in the same household.
The clause further provided that this exclusion did not apply to the
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 450.
477 S.W.2d
Id. at 941.
488 S.W.2d
498 S.W.2d
Id. at 159.
486 S.W.2d

937 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
140 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
154 (Tex. Sup. 1973).
399 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1972, no writ).
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named insured or his relatives while occupying a vehicle owned by a
designated insured or his relatives. Plaintiffs urged that the exclusion
was void as an improper restriction on coverage, but the court found
it to be valid, stating:
Although there have been no Texas decisions passing on the
validity of the exclusion in question, those jurisdictions that have
actually passed on the particular provision have held it to be clear
and unambiguous with the valid purpose of requiring the named
insured to secure additional uninsured motorists coverage for
himself and his relatives for any vehicles owned by relative residents of the same household. 8
Cases from Florida,8 Louisiana and Minnesota 87 were cited in support of this result.
A provision under "Limits of Liability" in the uninsured motorist
coverage which has as yet not received any definitive judicial treatment
is that which states:
Any payment made under this Part to or for any insured shall be
applied in reduction of the amount of damages which he may be
entitled to recover from any person insured under Coverage A,
Bodily Injury Liability.
The occasion for application of this clause would arise when a passenger in an automobile covered by a liability policy providing uninsured
-motorist coverage is hurt in an accident with an uninsured motorist
caused by negligence on the part of both drivers. If the passenger
has a cause of action against the driver of the vehicle he was occupying, there would be coverage of such liability by the insurer under the
bodily injury liability coverage of the policy. The passenger would
also be an insured under the uninsured motorist coverage, as a person
occupying an insured vehicle, and if legally entitled to recover from
the uninsured motorist, would come under the uninsured motorist coverage of the same policy. The effect of the quoted provision would
be that if the insurer makes any payment under the uninsured motorist
coverage in connection with the liability of the uninsured motorist, its
liability under the bodily injury coverage would be accordingly reduced.
While contained in the uninsured motorist section of the policy, this
84. Id. at 402-03.
85. United States Fidelity & Gttar. Co. v. Webb, 191 So. 2d 86 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1966).
86. Spencer v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 171 So. 2d 723 (La. Ct. App. 1965).
87. Smitke v. Travelers Indem. Co., I11 N.W.2d 217 (Minn. 1962).
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is really a liability coverage limitation. It does not provide for reduction of uninsured motorist coverage recovery, but rather for reduction
of liability coverage recovery by reason of payments made under the
uninsured motorist coverage. Therefore, it would not conflict with the
policy embodied in the uninsured motorist statutes, and liability coverage is not ordinarily mandatory by statute. However, if the policy
is one certified under a financial responsibility law, then an analogous
argument based upon statutory policy could be made against the validity of the provision.
CONCLUSION

From a review of the various situations and decisions above, one
clear conclusion is that each limiting clause must be considered on its
own merit and that it cannot properly be said that all such clauses
are valid nor that all such clauses are invalid. Thus, of the four exclusion or reduction situations above which have been passed upon by
the Texas courts, the policy provisions have been held invalid in two
instances and valid in two instances. While there may be a family
resemblance between all of these problems, still each one has its own
special considerations, and authorities dealing with one provision may
not be too confidently relied upon in connection with another. Uninsured motorist coverage is an important extension of the insurance protection provided by automobile insurance policies, but has also created
many legal problems, not all of which are yet completely resolved.
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